This paper studies a dynamic agency problem where a risk-averse agent can privately save. In the optimal contract, wages are downward rigid; permanent pay raises occur when the agent's historical performance is suf ciently good; and when the agent is dismissed due to his poor performance, he walks away with a severance pay to support his post-ring consumption at the current wage level. Thus, under realistic contracting frictions, seemingly inef cient compensation schemes can indeed be optimal.
Introduction
This paper studies a dynamic agency problem where the risk-averse agent controls the rm's pro tability through unobservable actions, and he can save privately (or, secretly save, hidden savings). We nd that in the optimal compensation contract, wages are non-decreasing, and the agent gets a severance pay even when he is dismissed due to his poor performance. Both features are commonly observed in reality.
In the dynamic contracting literature, Rogerson (1985) among others has found that without private savings, the optimal wage pattern tends to be "front-loaded," which means that the agent's expected marginal utility from consumption increases over time-the so-called inverse-martingale property. With access to a private savings account, the agent will smooth his consumption, thereby devastating the incentive scheme designed in the front-loaded contract. The optimal contract derived in this paper features a back-loaded, non-decreasing wage pattern, and the agent's motive in private saving is absent.
The general optimal contracting problem with private savings is complicated; we solve this model under a speci c setting. In this paper, cash ows follow a Poisson process. The cash ow arrival intensity is controlled by the agent's three levels of unobservable effort (action): shirking, working, and myopic, and the optimal contract implements the interior working effort. Shirking leads to no cash ow in the next time interval, and working generates a positive success intensity. The myopic action helps to improve the short-term "hard" cash ow performance, but hurts the rm's long-run value. We envision that these longrun destruction, usually taking forms unforeseen by investors, will be realized after the agent's tenure and therefore not contractible. 1 The optimal contract will discourage myopic behavior by avoiding incentives that load excessively on short-term cash ow performance.
This requirement, together with the linear effort cost structure, implies that investors should provide exact working incentives for the agent against shirking. This binding incentive-compatibility constraint (with respect to effort deviations) is key to solving the contracting problem with private savings. In our model, to implement the interior working effort when the agent can privately save, the contract cannot specify a wage cut after the agent's poor performance. The argument is based on the agent's potential joint deviation of "shirking and saving." Intuitively, a binding incentive-compatibility constraint implies that the agent loses nothing by shirking. As a result, if the contract assigns decreasing wages for no success, then because under shirking the path of no success occurs with probability one, the shirking agent who saves concurrently can strictly improve his payoff by smoothing his consumption along the path of no success.
In deriving the optimal contract, we rst solve the relaxed problem which only considers the necessary conditions that rule out the agent's local deviations, including the joint deviation described above. This relaxed problem allows for a recursive structure with two state variables: the agent's marginal utility, and the agent's continuation payoff. We then show that the obtained solution to the relaxed problem is indeed the optimal contract that solves the original problem. In the optimal contract, wages are downward rigid; the agent is guaranteed with the current wage level, and works for future pay raises (promotions) . Also, when a streak of poor performance leads to an endogenous termination, the agent walks away with a severance pay that supports his post-ring consumption at the current wage level. The severance pay is increasing in his past performance, and decreasing in his outside option. These features are widely observed in practice.
Whether private savings are possible or not makes the optimal wage contract drastically different. Figure   1 compares the optimal wage process in our model, to the one derived under the same setup except that the agent's savings are observable. For both cases, the agent starts with the same initial state, and experiences the same cash ow performance (at t = 0:5; 1; 1:5; and 3:5). When savings are observable (and therefore contractible), the agent's wages display a "zig-zag" pattern, responding actively to not only cash ow realizations, but also no cash ow realizations (which represent poor performance in this model). In contrast, when the agent can privately save, wages are only adjusted upward, never responding to poor performance.
On severance pay, the red agent leaves the company with nothing in the case with observable savings.
However, the private-saving case features a positive severance pay when the agent is dismissed due to his poor performance. 2 Several extensions are considered in Section 6, including the renegotiation-proof contract in Section 6.4.
In Section 6.5, we show that our model is robust to the non-contractibility of the myopic action loss. motivated by a multi-tasking model analyzed in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , we allow this non-contractible loss to be re ected by a noisy but contractible measure. When the precision of this noisy measure goes to zero, the value from an optimal complete contract converges to the one from the incomplete contract that ignores this almost informationless measure. Therefore, if there exists some xed information acquisition cost, then the contract derived in this paper could be indeed optimal in a complete contract paradigm. Also, we employ a new method in establishing the convergence result, where we do not need to solve for the optimal complete contract per se. This paper belongs to the burgeoning continuous-time contracting literature. 3 Our model takes a framework similar to DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) , who study a continuous-time version of the DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) model. Biais et al. (2007) show that the contract of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) arises in the limit of discrete-time model. In all three papers the agent is risk-neutral, which eliminates the saving incentives. 4 Sannikov (2008) studies an optimal contracting problem with a risk-averse agent where savings are observable and contractible.
The problem studied in this paper is akin to the literature on unemployment insurance, e.g., Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) . Kocherlakota (2004) solves an optimal unemployment insurance contract where the agent's savings are private. The discrete-time model of Kocherlakota (2004) features a single success of permanent employment, but the idea of implementing interior effort under a linear effort cost structure is similar. We study a more general setup with multiple cash ows in a continuous-time framework, allow for endogenous termination with severance pay in the employment contract, and provide rigorous justi cations and proofs for the optimality of the contract. For more detailed comparison to Kocherlakota (2004) , including the advantage of the continuous-time analysis, see Section 6.1.3. 5;6 investors' discount rate. On the Poisson structure, Sannikov (2007) investigates an upward-jump model (as the paper here) with both moral hazard and adverse selection (the later version of the paper uses the Brownian setup), and Biais et al. (2009) who incorporate accident risk which is modeled as downward poisson jumps. Another strand of continuous-time contracting literature starts from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) . This framework allows for private savings, due to the absence of wealth effect. See, e.g., Fudenberg , Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1990 ), Williams (2006 ), and He (2008 ; the latter two characterize the optimal contract with private savings. 5 A recent paper by Mitchell and Zhang (2007) shows that it is never optimal to implement interior effort in the setting of Kocherlakota (2004) . Similar to Kocherlakota (2004) , they only consider one single success, and there is no termination. Interestingly, based on CARA preference and linear additive effort costs (rather than monetary effort costs as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) ), they provide a nice solution to optimal contracting with private savings and binary-effort. In their analysis, allowing for negative consumption is important. In contrast, our paper imposes the realistic constraint that the agent's consumption (therefore the wage payment in equilibrium) has to be nonnegative. 6 Other related literature on agency issues with access to credit market (especially hidden savings) includes Allen (1987) , Bizer and DeMarzo (1999) , Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) , and Bisin and Rampini (2006) , etc. Fundamentally, the issue of hidden savings is that hidden information (in contrast to hidden action as effort) arises during the long-term contractual relationship. Under Harris and Holmstrom (1982) nd that the downward-rigid wage is optimal. Their mechanism is fundamentally different from ours. In their learning-based model, without moral hazard issues, the rst-best wage contract features a constant wage for the risk-averse agent to fully insure his productivity shocks. If the agent can quit, then a competitive labor market implies that looking forward, the agent's future compensation has to stay above his expected productivity at any time during the employment. In other words, the agent's ex-post participation constraint might be binding. As a result, to match the agent's outside option, the contract will specify a wage raise in response to suf ciently good news about the agent's productivity. 7
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 and Section 4 solve the relaxed problem recursively. In Section 5, we verify that downward rigid wages with severance pay are optimal. Section 6 discusses the optimal contract, and considers several extensions. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs are given in the Appendix.
The Model

Technology
Consider a continuous-time in nite-horizon principal-agent model, where the risk-neutral investors (the principal) of an in nitely-lived rm hire a risk-averse agent for business operation. For any t > 0, the rm generates cash ows Y dN t in the interval (t dt; t], where fN t g is a standard Poisson process with intensity fag, and Y is a positive constant. Denote F N = F N t t 0 as the ltration generated by fN t g. Later on we use "cash ow," "jump," and "success" interchangeably. The cash ows are observable and contractible.
The agent can generate at most K cash ows. Even though our results holds for any nite K (we use induction analysis), later for the sake of convenience we present results for the stationary case where K ! 1. When the employment ceases, i.e., the agent is red, investors can liquidate the rm's assets for an exogenous value L, which is normalized to zero. This implies that early termination is inef cient. One can easily endogenize L by a costly replacement with another new agent. Both the agent and investors discount future payoffs at a constant market interest rate r > 0.
The agent's unobservable effort process fag (a F N -predictable process, i.e., making effort choice before knowing whether or not a cash ow occurs) controls the intensity process. There are three effort levels, i.e., a t 2 f0; p; pg, where p > p > 0 and p p is small. The agent's non-pecuniary personal effort cost (or enjoys private bene t if negative) when exerting a t , in terms of the agent's utilities, is b at p 1 dt, where b is a positive constant. 8 We call the lowest effort a t = 0 as shirking. By shirking, the agent enjoys a private a discrete state-space framework, Fernandes and Phelan (2000) and Doepke and Townsend (2006) propose a recursive method to handle this issue in certain class of problems. 7 Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2007) embeds a capital structure decision into this framework; they highlight the importance of human capital when rms choose the optimal capital structure. Lustig, Syverson, and van Nieuwerburgh (2008) develop a calibratable model based on Harris and Holmstrom (1982) to study the relationship between managerial compensation inequality and organization capital. 8 The discrete structure of the agent's action space is immaterial; the key is the linearity of the agent's effort cost structure, and bene t bdt, but the intensity of cash ow is zero. The agent can choose the working effort a t = p; in this case he obtains zero private bene t, but the rm generates cash ows with a probability pdt in the interval (t dt; t].
In this model, the agent can exert the highest myopic effort p > p to increase the cash ow intensity.
In the spirit of Stein (1989) , this myopic action is detrimental to the liquidation value L, as it represents the short-term performance-enhancing strategies that hurt the rm's long-run value. We assume that these losses borne by investors, dt, are non-contractible. 9
There are other ways to interpret this non-contractible loss, and in this paper we keep our interpretations general. Note that L can be interpreted as the rm's on-going value after the agent is red, and the loss due to these myopic actions might only be uncovered after the agent's tenure. 10 This idea is also similar to the multi-tasking problem studied in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) (see related analysis in Section 6.5).
There, if the compensation contract imposes excessive incentives on the hard and easy-to-measure performance (cash ow occurrence in this model), the agent will ignore other dimensions of soft performances that are critical to the rm-for instance, refusing to collaborate with his colleagues thereby lowering their ef ciency. The bottom line is that the myopic action captures the cost of high-powered incentive schemes, a well-documented fact in both economic and nance literatures (e.g., Stein (1989) , Jensen (2005) , and Larkin (2006), etc.).
Throughout the paper we consider the case that it is optimal to implement the working effort a t = p always. We verify the optimality of this policy later in Section 5.3.
The Agent
Utility function. The agent's instantaneous utility from consumption is u (c t ), where u 0 > 0, u 00 0, and c t 0 is the consumption rate. When the agent is hired in the rm, his total utility e u (c t ; a t ) takes an additive form, i.e.,
When the agent is red, his instantaneous utility is simply u (c t ) without the effort-dependent term.
implementing the interior effort in the optimal contract. For instance, the analysis will be the same if we assume that at 2 [0; p], and there exists a critical level p < p such that any at 2 (p; p] triggers the myopic loss. 9 As argued in their footnote 4 in Hart and Moore (1998) , if investors value these liquidated assets more than the market does, then the liquidation value can be non-veri able, therefore non-contractible. We can also formally model this idea in the following way. Assume that the liquidation value L is positive and random; and whenever the agent exerts a = p, the expected (discounted) liquidation value L drops by at least dt. During liquidation, investors (as banks with specialty in locating the second-best users) handle the liquidation process, and report a liquidation value b L which might differ from the true liquidation value L. Ruling out a third party (due to the possibility of collusion, etc.), the information revealed by the report b L becomes as if non-contractible. 10 For instance, in August 2007, Dell restated down its past four years' earnings by up to $150 million, and the executives who were responsible to this scandal have left the company. (Data source: "Dell to Restate Earnings After Probe," http:biz.yahoo.com/ap/070816/dell_restatement.html.) Also, the agent's higher personal cost due to myopic actions could incorporate the future extra costs (such as career concerns) borne by himself, as long as these costs are exogenous to the current employment contract.
Remark 1 The agent's post-ring utility u (c t ) is below his total utility u (c t ) + b if he is shirking inside the rm. This speci cation implies that, the shirking bene t-which can be interpreted as enjoying perks or even personal satisfaction-is only available when the agent is hired in the rm. This constitutes one main difference from Kocherlakota (2004) , where the unemployed agent does not have any additional bene t by simply staying in the unemployment insurance program. Therefore in contrast to Kocherlakota (2004) , in our model termination/ ring is invoked along the equilibrium path as a punishment mechanism.
For the working effort to be optimal, we have to rule out "extreme" wealth effects. Formally, we assume that there exists a strictly positive number L such that
Intuitively, from the agent's view, the monetary equivalence (marginally) of the effort cost is b=u 0 . Therefore, condition (2) places an upper bound on the agent's monetary cost of effort. 11
Though our results hold for general utility functions (see Section 6.3), in the main analysis we focus on a special form of u ( ), which is the modi ed CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility de ned as follows:
In words, to respect condition (2), we simply replace the upper part (when c 1 ln L ) of the CARA utility by a linear function with slope L > 0 (so the agent becomes risk-neutral when he is suf ciently wealthy).
The CARA form possesses the convenient feature that the marginal utility is linear in the utility level, which simpli es our analysis. Note that different from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) who adopt a setting with monetary effort costs, the wealth effect is present in our model.
Private savings. In this paper the agent can privately save for the consumption smoothing purposes. As rst noted by Rogerson (1985) , when the agent's utility is additive as in (1), the optimal contract without private savings features an "inverse-martingale property." Under this property, the agent's marginal utility follows a submartingale (i.e., the expected marginal utility increases over time). This is against the "consumption-smoothing property" if the agent can privately save.
We rule out the agent's borrowing from a third party. Borrowing technology where a bank expects repayments from the agent is inconsistent with the agents' private-saving technology. Our main results go through if the borrowing rate exhibits a suf ciently large spread over the saving rate r, or if the agent faces a xed borrowing limit. 12 11 Given a nite number (K) of cash ow jumps, the marginal utility level L may never be reached in equilibrium. 12 With a xed borrowing limit, in the optimal contract investors can max out the borrowing limit, and the agent is always borrowing constrained. The critical issue that a borrowing technology brings on is the agent's option of default. Without complication of default, the framework with CARA preference (with monetary effort cost) with borrowing and negative consumption allows for a tractable solution with private savings (see Williams (2006) , and He (2008)). With default, the key assumption is whether banks
Employment Contract
An employment contract speci es a wage process fc t 0 : 0 t < g, and a lump-sum transfer F 0 at the termination event when the agent is red, where is the endogenous termination time. We denote such a contract as ffcg ; F ; g, and each element is F N -adapted (performance-based compensation contract). Here, because of the agent's limited liability, any contractual payment to the agent must be nonnegative.
The agent has zero initial wealth. For simplicity, after the agent remains unemployed forever (so his outside option is zero). The case of positive outside option is considered later in Section 6.2.
Denote the agent's savings account balance as S t 0 (recall the borrowing constraint), which earns interest at the rate r. Given the contract , the agent's problem is: 13
where E a [ ] indicates that the probability measure is induced by the agent's effort policy fag; and fb cg and discounted utility after the termination.
We focus on the contract that implement working fa t = pg always. The following lemma is a standard result in dynamic contracting (see, e.g., Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) )
Lemma 1 Without loss of generality, we only consider contracts that induce no savings.
Intuitively, whenever the agent wants to save, investors can do the savings for him. Therefore, we call the contract incentive-compatible and no-savings, if ffag = fpg ; fb cg = fcg ; b c = rF g solves the problem in (4). The optimal contract solves the investors' problem:
max is incentive-compatible and no-savings
where E [ ] is under the probability measure induced by fa t = pg, i.e., the agent is working all the time before termination. Because the agent always enjoys some non-negative rents, in this problem the agent's participation constraint never binds. Denote the solution to this problem as .
can seize the agent's private savings or not when he defaults. Bizer and DeMarzo (1999) point out that if banks can seize the agent's private savings in the default stage, then the debt-overhang problem (so the agent's marginal dollar of saving might go to banks when the personal debt is under water) will discourage the agent's saving motive and restore the ef ciency. 13 Heuristically, the sequence of events during (t dt; t] is: 1) the agent makes effort decision at; 2) the cash ow realization (or not) is observed; 3) the agent receives wage ct according to his performance; and 4) the agent makes consumption/saving decision by choosing consumption b ct. This sequence ensures that the effort process is F N -predictable (i.e., does not depend on the cash ow realization at (t dt; t]), while the wage/consumption process is F N -adapted (i.e., can depend on the cash ow realization at (t dt; t])
State Variables in the Relaxed Problem
We employ a relaxation method in this paper. We rst analyze two state variables that help us solve the relaxed problem: 1) the agent's continuation payoff, and 2) the agent's marginal utility from consumption.
Based on the agent's (local) joint deviation strategy, in Section 3.3 we specify the necessary conditions on the evolutions of two state variables, and formulate the relaxed problem recursively only with these necessary conditions. Later we solve the relaxed problem in Section 4, and further verify that the obtained solution is indeed the solution to the original problem (5) in Section 5.
Our analysis is based on the stochastic calculus in jump processes (e.g., Protter (1990) ), in which the following notation is required. For any F N -adapted right-continuous-left-limit process fAg, de ne its lefthand limit as:
is the process fAg's time-t value before (after) observing whether or not there is a cash ow realization during the interval (t dt; t].
Continuation Payoff and Incentive-Compatibility Constraint
In this paper, we use the incentive-compatibility constraint exclusively for the agent's effort choice. In other words, we say that at any time t the contract is incentive-compatible, if the agent's single effort deviation (from working a t = p, to shirking a t = 0 or myopic action a t = p), while xing the follow-up effortconsumption policies, cannot improve the agent's value.
Given a contract = f ; fcg ; F g, we introduce the agent's continuation payoff, W t , as,
which is the agent's future value from the contract if he keeps working (so a t = p always) until termination, and conducts no savings. It is important to note that, in equilibrium, W t has to be the agent's optimal value among all possible deviation strategies.
Using Eq. (6), the martingale representation result allows us to write the evolution of W as (see the proof of Proposition 1), 14
where W t is some F N -predictable process. Economically, the martingale loading W t measures the responsiveness of the agent's continuation payoff to the unexpected performance dN t pdt under the equilibrium working effort.
In Eq. (7), W t controls the agent's incentives to exert effort, xing the agent's equilibrium consumption plans as recommended by the contract. Intuitively, the agent's local effort decision is as follows. Choosing a t affects the agent's effort cost b 1 at p dt; however, this also sets the drift of dN t to be a t in his continuation payoff. As a result, the agent is solving
Because the objective is linear in a t , W t has to equal b p in order to implement the interior working effort a t = p.
Under the framework of binary effort levels (e.g., DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) ), to motivate working against shirking, the incentive W t must be no less than b p . Because the same argument can be applied to the effort choice between "working" and "myopic action," to prevent a = p, W t must be no greater than b p . In words, because highly powered incentives can induce some myopic actions from the agent, investors never impose excessive incentives on the agent. As a result, W t = b p . 15 We have the following proposition, in line with Sannikov (2008) :
Proposition 1 For any employment contract to be incentive-compatible, the agent's continuation payoff W t evolves according to (7), and W t = b p for all t 2 [0; ) a.e.. This implies that the agent is indifferent between working and shirking, i.e., he obtains the same value by taking a t = 0 or p for any t 2 [0; ).
For illustration, consider the following discrete-time example (which we will use it again in the next subsection). Ignore discounting (r = 0), and set p = 0:5, b = 2. Suppose that at date t before consumption, the agent is promised with a continuation payoff of 11. Consider a contract where the agent's date t consumption c t = 1, and assume that u (1) = 1. Then his post-consumption continuation payoff at t is 10. In equilibrium, for promise keeping we must have
where W 1 t+1 (or W 0 t+1 ) is the pre-consumption continuation payoff at date t + 1 with (or without) success along the equilibrium path. This condition (8) re ects the drift in Eq. (7): with r = 0, there is no drift, therefore W t is a martingale. Now it is clear that the reward difference W 1 t+1 W 0 t+1 pins down the agent's working incentives. To implement interior working, however, it must be the case that W 1 t+1 = 12 and W 0 t+1 = 8. If not, say W 1 t+1 = 13 (or 11) and W 0 t+1 = 7 (or 9), then the agent will take the myopic (or shirking) action. 16 Here, the incentive loading W t = W 1 t+1 W 0 t+1 = b p = 4. Note that if the agent shirks, his deviation payoff is b + W 0 t+1 = 10, which is just his date-t post-consumption payoff under working along the equilibrium path. 15 The standard binary-effort setting without private saving issues (e.g., DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) , He (2009)) features binding incentive-compatibility constraint in the optimal contract. In contrast, here the binding incentive-compatibility constraint is directly due to the presence of myopic actions. 16 For instance, if W 1 t+1 = 11 and W 0 t+1 = 9, by shirking the agent's deviation value is b + W 0 t+1 = 2 + 9 = 11 > 10 = 0:5W 1 t+1 + 0:5W 0 t+1 , which is the value from working.
Marginal Utility
Now we investigate the agent's saving incentives. Denote the agent's marginal utility at time t as M t u 0 (c t ). We have the following proposition, based on the requirement that the agent's continuation payoff W t has to be the optimal value among all possible deviation strategies.
Proposition 2
The the necessary conditions for to be incentive-compatible and no-savings are:
1. The continuation payoff process fW g evolves according to (7),
2. For all 0 t < t 0 < , the agent's marginal utility process fM g satis es E a t [M t 0 ] M t a.e., where the agent's action a s = 0 or p for s 2 (t; t 0 ).
To gain some intuition, we discuss the implication of Condition 2 on the equilibrium dynamics of M ; in Section 3.3 we will state the result formally. To rule out private savings, the agent's expected marginal utility must be non-increasing over time; otherwise, the agent can smooth his consumption and obtain a deviation value strictly higher than his equilibrium continuation payoff W . Heuristically, the marginal utility must satisfy:
where E at t [M t ] is the conditional expectation of M t given effort choice a t before knowing whether or not there is a cash ow in (t dt; t].
As a salient feature of any dynamic agency problem, the probability measure is induced by the agent's endogenous effort choice a t . Necessarily, under the equilibrium working effort, condition (9) requires that
where M 0 t (M 1 t ) is the agent's marginal utility at t without (with) success during the interval (t dt; t]. More importantly, because the agent obtains the same payoff from shirking (recall Proposition 1), the same result must hold for the off-equilibrium shirking effort a = 0. Speci cally, when the agent shirks-so for sure there is no jump-condition (9) requires that
This immediately implies a surprising result that cutting wage after failure violates condition (11), because on the path of no success the agent's marginal utility (wage) cannot rise (fall).
Intuitively, this result is derived from the agent's potential joint deviation of shirking and saving; for a similar argument, see Kocherlakota (2004) . Following the previous discrete-time example discussed in the end of Section 3.1, let us assume that u 0 (1) = 1, u 0 (0:8) = 1:1, and u 0 (1:2) = 0:9. Recall that c t = 1. Consider a hypothetical wage-cut contract which assigns a lower wage after poor performance, e.g., set c 0 t+1 = 0:8 and c 1 t+1 = 1:2. Recall that p = 0:5 in this example; this wage-cut contract satis es the no-savings condition (10) under the measure induced by working, but violates the no-savings condition (11) under the measure induced by shirking. Here, the agent's pro table joint-deviation under this hypothetical wage-cut contract is as follows. In the end of Section 3.1, we have shown that by deviating from working to shirking, the agent's pre-consumption continuation payoff at t is still 11. Now the agent can concurrently save 0:1 for date t+1; and because there will be no success for sure tomorrow, his pre-consumption deviation value at t becomes (simply assume that he follows the equilibrium strategies from t + 1 on):
where 11 is the agent's equilibrium payoff. Therefore this wage-cut contract fails to be incentive-compatible and no-savings.
Remark 2 Condition (11) only states that wage cannot fall after a failure. Even combining with condition (10), they do not necessary imply downward rigid wages, because we have not yet ruled out the possibility of cutting wages after success, i.e., M 1 t > M t (in terms of wages, c 1 t < c t ). In Kocherlakota (2004) , the downward-rigidity is easily shown because there is only one success (so the contracting problem essentially ends after a success). That simple argument does not apply in this paper with multiple cash ows.
Nevertheless, using the dynamic programming approach, later in Section 4.4.3 we rule out the case of cutting wages after success, and show that the optimal contract features
Translating this condition to a statement of wages, the agent's wages are downward-rigid: Wages remains constant without jumps, but might rise in response to successes.
Remark 3 The linearity of effort cost and the presence of myopic action play important role in the analysis.
Essentially, they force the incentive-compatibility constraint to be binding when the agent chooses working against shirking (Proposition 1). Without them, the contract may impose highly-powered incentives so that the agent nds it strictly worse off when he deviates to shirking. For instance, if there is no myopic action, then the contract can set W t > b p . Then by shirking, the agent loses W t b p > 0, and the local shirkingsaving strategy illustrated by the previous numerical example might not be pro table. As a result, we will no longer have the key condition (11). Similar argument applies to the case of convex effort cost. See related discussions in Section 5.3.2 and Section 6.5. In Conclusion we further discusses other robustness issues, including the assumption that the probability of success under shirking is 0.
Formulating the Relaxed Problem
We have derived the necessary conditions in Proposition 2 for the contract to be incentive-compatible and no-savings. The relaxed problem just replaces the original constraints in Problem (5) with these necessary conditions. Also, we rule out randomization in solving the relaxed problem. Because later on we show that the investors' value function without randomization is concave, this treatment is without loss of generality.
Dynamics of state variables.
To be in line with the analysis of jump processes (e.g., Protter (1990) , Biais et al. (2009) ), we use the left-hand limit of fW g and fM g, i.e., W t lim s"t W t and M t lim s"t M t , to be the state variables. 17
According to Proposition 2, the (left-limit of) agent's continuation payoff W t follows:
The agent's marginal utility serves as the second state variable in this model. 18 We have the following lemma which gives a formal statement of the dynamics of M t . Here, dM D t 0 in (14) 
3.3.2 Recursive formulation.
Recall that in our model the agent can generate at most K cash ows. Let W 0 W 0 and M 0 M 0 .
Denote by J K (W 0 ; M 0 ) the investors' value given the initial state variables W 0 and M 0 , where K denote the number of remaining cash ows. The relaxed problem, in its recursive formulation, is
subject to the constraints (12), (13), (14) and (15).
Solution to the Relaxed Problem
Based on the dynamic programming technique, we solve the relaxed problem in this section in a heuristic way; in Section 5 we will formally verify that the solution indeed solves the relaxed problem. In Section 5
we also verify that the solution in fact solves the original problem; therefore it is the optimal contract that we are after.
Preliminaries
We can construct the investors' value function J K (W t ; M t ) iteratively (see Appendix A.6). Because the key properties of value function is independent of K, for illustration purpose in the main text we take K to in nity, and denote J (W t ; M t ) = J 1 (W t ; M t ). To save notation, most of time we will use (W; M )
as arguments for the value function J ( ; ), and it is understood that (W; M ) corresponds to (W t ; M t ) :
Several functions are useful in later analysis. It is clear that the agent's marginal utility M 2 [ L ; ].
Since when M = L the analysis is trivial (the agent becomes risk-neutral; see Section 4.5 for this case), we focus on the strictly concave part of (3). To express the agent's utility and consumption in terms of M , we de ne the utility function,
and the consumption function,
The fact that U (M ) is linear in M , a unique property of CARA utility, simpli es the following derivation.
When the agent is red, to ful ll the continuation payoff W investors will simply pay the agent F = u 1 (rW ) r . Therefore we de ne the investors' value function at termination as,
Optimal Contract and Time Line
To solve the relaxed problem, we take the guess-and-verify approach. The rst step is to guess the optimal policy, which is illustrated in Figure 2 . It depicts the time-line where the subperiod of n th cash ow is highlighted. As shown, we decompose each subperiod into the wage-setting stage and the production stage.
Given an occurrence of cash ow, in the wage-setting stage investors have the option to raise the agent's wage from c (M ) to c (M 0 ), which corresponds to the optimal marginal utility response M t . Then we enter the production stage, where the agent keeps working (a t = p) until the n th cash ow realizes, or is red before the n th cash ow realization.
As shown in Figure 3 , J (W; M ), which is the value function in the wage setting stage, incorporates the investors' option value to raise the agent's wage before they ask the agent to work. Denote by e J (W; M ) the value function in the production stage which excludes this option value. Figure 2 : Time-line for the optimal contracting. The n th cash ow subperiod starts with the occurrence of (n 1) th cash ow. Investors can raise the agent's wage (wage-setting stage with value function e J (W; M )) from c (M ) to c (M 0 ). Afterwards the agent works to produce the n th cash ow (production stage with value function J (W; M )). The project is liquidated and the agent is red if his continuation payoff W hits U (M 0 ) r before the occurrence of the n th cash ow. These two stages repeat themselves for the following subperiods.
Production Stage: Construction of e J (W; M )
The construction is backward. Speci cally, we take as given the value function J (W; M ) in the wagesetting stage after the realization of the n th cash ow; we then move backward to consider the production and wage-setting stages in the n th cash ow subperiod, which is before the realization of the n th cash ow.
As shown in Figure 2 , suppose that at time t n 1 the (n 1) th cash ow occurs and both parties enter the wage-setting stage. Suppose that in the wage-setting stage investors set a marginal utility M t n 1 for the agent who has a continuation payoff W t n 1 . This gives the initial state of the production stage.
Dynamics of state variables.
Due to (12), without success W evolves as:
For the dynamics of M in (13), we will verify in the next subsection that in the production stage it is optimal to set dM D t = 0: 
The left-hand-side is the investors' required return. On the right-hand-side, the rst term is the expected cash ow, and the second term is the wage payment. The last two terms capture the value change due to the evolution of state variable W t : the third term is the expected value change due to the jump from W t to W t + b p , and the fourth term is the value change due to the drift of W t without jump. We will show that W < b+U (M ) r along the equilibrium path in the next subsection. Intuitively, b+U (M ) r is the upper bound of the agent's continuation payoff W given M . 21 From another angle, W < b+U (M ) r implies that W decreases without success in (19), which represents punishment given failures.
Given W < b+U (M ) r , the Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) in (21) admits a closed-form solution:
One can read the solution as follows: at any state (W 0 ; M ), investors' instantaneous gain is simply
which is the expected value upon success, minus the wage payment. Therefore, the investors' value at state (W; M ) is the integration over these instantaneous success gains for W 0 < W , plus the liquidation 21 The value b+U (M ) r is the agent's guaranteed annuity utility from consumption, plus his permanent shirking bene t-which is the highest value that investors can possibly deliver given the wage level c (M ). We list the main properties of the production stage value function e J in Proposition 3. As the xed-point argument suggests, they are based on the properties of J in the wage-setting stage, which we will study in the next subsection. the second estimation result follows from the fact that the pay raise has to be permanent. 22
The concavity of e J in property 2 implies that any randomization beyond cash ow shocks is suboptimal.
To ensure concavity, we need the following suf cient condition on the project's pro tability (which is used in the proof of Lemma 5 in Appendix A.6):
The third property pertains to the optimal wage-setting policy, which we will turn to in the next subsection. Recall that at time t n 1 the (n 1) th cash ow occurs. Suppose that M t n 1 = M , and the agent now has a continuation payoff W t n 1 = W t n 1 + b p . If investors decide to keep the same marginal utility (i.e., set M t n 1 = M = M t n 1 ) and enter the production stage, then we know that investors obtains a value e J (W; M ) as shown in the previous section. However, investors have the option to raise the agent's wage (or, reduce M ) and enter the production stage with a new state W t n 1 ; M 0 . Of course, this option is
Wage
Following this idea, we de ne the optimal marginal utility level M , as a function of W , as
We then de ne the investors' value function at the wage-setting stage to be:
Simply put, whenever the realization of cash ow brings the state (W; M ) to be above the curve M (W ),
investors reduce M to M (W ) by exercising the option of raising the agent's wage, as shown in Figure 3 .
This implies that the optimal response of marginal utility M -i.e., M t in (13)-to a cash realization at t is:
The transformation in (25) The economic rationale behind the wage-setting policy is the trade-off between the termination cost and the consumption smoothing bene t. From the cost side, as w = W U (M ) r captures the distance to liquidation (see Figure 3 ), a smaller M reduces w, leading to a higher termination probability. Intuitively, given a promised continuation payoff W , the agent's future rent (beyond his wage guarantee) will be smaller for a higher wage guarantee. This implies a more stringent punishment scheme, which makes the costly termination more likely. On the bene t side, due to the agent's risk-aversion, raising wage gives a consumptionsmoothing bene t (as the agent's equilibrium consumption pattern is back-loaded). Consequently, the opti- 
Raising wages without success?
In this section we now rule out the case of raising wages without success. In other words, investors will not exercise the option of raising wages along the path without success (i.e., maintain M as constant). This result has two important implications. First, this is the implicit assumption dM D t = 0 in (20) that we used in deriving e J in Section 4.3. Second, combining dM D t = 0 with the condition M t pdt dM D t in (15) gives M t < 0, which further implies that cutting wages after success M 1 t > M t is impossible. Therefore, we rule out the concern raised in Remark 2, and in the optimal contract wages are downward-rigid.
To see this result, note that for states below M (W ), due to the construction in (25), we have J W M = e J W M < 0. After wage-setting, the production stage must start from some state W t n 1 ; M on or below M (W ), such that J M W t n 1 ; M 0 (see Figure 3 ). Suppose that the n th cash ow occurs at t n > t n 1 .
Then along the path without success, we have W t < W t n 1 for (t 2 t n 1 ; t n ]. But J W M < 0 implies that J M (W t ; M ) > J M W t n 1 ; M 0, and as a result raising wages (reducing M ) is suboptimal. Intuitively, the marginal bene t of raising wages is smaller for subsequent lower continuation payoffs without success. If it is optimal to maintain the wage when W = W t n 1 initially, then it must be the case as well along the path without success.
Upper-First-Best Region
The above analysis does not cover the upper-rst-best region
the agent becomes risk neutral; see Figure 3 . In that region, the optimal contract is straightforward: the riskneutral agent with W b+U ( L ) r consumes wages never below c ( L ), keeps working always, and obtains b p L from each cash ow realization Y . There is no future inef cient termination, and the rst-best result is achieved. For derivations of J in this upper-rst-best region, see Appendix A.6.3.
Veri cation of the Optimal Contract
Verifying the Optimal Solution to the Relaxed Problem
We rst verify the contract described in Section 4 solves the relaxed problem formulated in Section 3.3. For any contract that satis es the necessary conditions stated in Proposition 2, we introduce the investors' auxiliary gain process G t ( ) as
Recall the dynamics of two state variables in (12), (13), (14), and (15):
Note that here the relevant controls are dM D t and M t , and the heuristic result in Section 4 suggests that the optimal control is dM D t = 0 in (20) and M t = min M W t + b p M t ; 0 in (26).
The investors' expected instantaneous gain, which captures the drift of G t (scaled by e rt ), is (note that
In the proof of Proposition 5, we show that the optimal policy to maximize E t e rt dG t is setting dM D t = 0 and M t = min M W t + b p M t ; 0 , which exactly correspond to the optimal contract described in Section 4. Due to the construction in Section 4, we have E t e rt dG t = 0 under the optimal policy, and E t e rt dG t 0 for other incentive-compatible and no-savings contracts. Then the standard veri cation argument leads to the following proposition, which shows that our contract in Section 4 solves the relaxed problem formulated in Section 3.3. Finally, since J is concave, randomization cannot improve the investors' value.
Proposition 5 
Verifying the Optimal Contract for the Original Problem
Now we show that the solution to the relaxed problem is the solution to the original problem. The key observation is that, under the downward-rigid wage contract in Proposition 5, the agent's optimal strategy is to exert working effort and maintain zero savings always (for a formal argument, see the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A.7.1). In other words, the obtained solution not only satis es the necessary conditions identi ed in Proposition 2, but also satis es the tighter constraints (i.e., a smaller set of feasible contracts) imposed by the original problem (5). As a result, the solution to the relaxed problem is indeed the solution to the investor's original problem (5). Therefore we have the following main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 1 Under the optimal contract that implements working, we have
and
The employment is terminated whenever W = U (M ) r , and the agent gets a severance pay F = c(M ) r . 24 When W t > U ( L )+b r and M t = M (W t ) = L , the rst-best result is achieved: Investors pay the
, ask him to work forever, and pay him b p L whenever a cash ow occurs.
Optimality of Implementing Working
In this section we verify that, under certain suf cient conditions, it is optimal to implement working always.
Skipping this section will not hinder the reading of Section 6.
When a certain action a t is implemented at time t, the evolution of W follows:
where W t ( ) b p if a t = 0(p) (the proof will be similar to that of Proposition 1; see also Sannikov (2008) ). Our task is to ensure that E t e rt dG t 0 when investors implement actions other than working.
Suboptimality of shirking.
Suppose that at time t shirking is implemented; then we must have
p . Because there is no success when shirking is implemented, dN t (a t = 0) = 0. Moreover, to prevent the agent from saving we must have dM t = dM D t 0. Since J M 0, it is optimal to set dM D t = 0, and e rt dG t [ rJ c (M ) + J W (rW U (M ) b)] dt:
Due to the construction of e J (therefore J) in the ODE (21), we need the following condition to ensure e rt dG t 0: 25
Since property 1 in Proposition 4 implies that 1 L J W , we have the following suf cient condition:
24 Here using or makes no difference, because termination cannot occur on the point of cash ow realization (given a success, the agent's continuation payoff
). 25 The ODE in (21) This condition is ensured by the parameter restriction in (23). Moreover, the above condition is also necessary to rule out shirking, because it is the standard condition for the suboptimality of shirking when the agent becomes risk-neutral in the upper-rst-best states (where J is linear in W ). Intuitively, for working to be optimal, the expected cash ow pY should be greater than the upper-bound of the agent's equivalent "monetary" effort cost, which is b= L when the agent becomes suf ciently wealthy.
Suboptimality of myopic actions.
If the myopic action a = p is implemented at t, then for some W t b p , we can write the evolution of W t as,
We need to show that the auxiliary gain process G in (27) has a negative drift once p is implemented.
Let us pause to discuss the economic intuition. There is a non-contractible loss due to the myopic action. On the bene t side, the myopic action boosts the cash ow intensity to p. We envision that the gain p p is small. Are there any other gains by implementing the myopic action in this model?
The answer is yes. In Remark 3 we note that the binding incentive-compatibility constraint W t = b p plays a key role in applying the joint-deviation argument in Section 3.2. Now when W t > b p , the agent's incentive-compatibility constraint is slack, and condition (11) no longer holds. In other words, under a highly-powered incentive scheme, the optimal contract punishes shirking severely and therefore deters the agent's joint-deviation of "shirking and saving." As a result, cutting the agent's wage after his failure-which is a potentially value-improving policy because of J M > 0-becomes possible.
In this case, because the unidimensional variable M is no longer suf cient to capture the agent's privatesaving incentives (which depend on the entire continuation contract), it is dif cult to pinpoint the bene t of adjusting the wage downward. Fortunately, we can use the necessary (local) no-savings condition under the effort choice a = p to bound this bene t. We can write the evolution of M as:
Then the no-savings condition under a t = p requires that dM t has a non-positive drift (supermartingale):
Because after a jump it must be true that M t + M t L , we have a more explicit bound for dM D t which captures wage reduction without success (note that M t L > 0):
Essentially, this condition places a bound on the increment dM D t , which in turn gives a bound for the gain in cutting wages. Based on (29), in Appendix A.8.1 we derive a suf cient condition for the loss to offset the upper-bound estimate of this gain:
Because the actual gain (subject to additional constraints regarding the agent's other deviating strategies) must be lower, we provide a suf cient condition for the suboptimality of implementing the myopic action.
Verifying the optimality of working.
By combining the above results, we have the following proposition. The proof is based on the standard veri cation argument.
Proposition 6 Under the conditions (28) and (30), it is optimal to implement working always.
6 Discussions and Extensions
Optimal Wage Contract
We now discuss the optimal wage contract. In the optimal contract, the agent is promised with a life-time wage guarantee. If the agent's performance is suf ciently good, he will receive pay raises (as promotions), and these raises are permanent. On the other hand, given poor performance, the agent is dismissed with a severance pay to support his post-ring consumption at his current wage level, and he loses potential future pay raises.
Comparison to the case with observable savings.
The possibility of private savings has a dramatic impact on the optimal wage policy. Keep the same model, but consider the only modi cation that the agent's savings are (publicly) observable. In this case, the agent's consumption, which is just the wage paid by investors, is contractible. As a dynamic agency problem with hidden actions studied in Sannikov (2008) , the agent's continuation payoff W t is the only state variable in solving for the optimal contract (see Appendix A.9), and the optimal wage becomes a function of the continuation payoff W t . 26 We graph the optimal wage policies (left scale) and associated continuation payoff dynamics (right scale)
in Figure 4 . The history consists of 4 cash ows occurred in t = 0:5, 1:0, 1:5, and 3:5; afterwards the agent generates no cash ows even with his effort input. The top (bottom) panel is for the case with observable (private) savings; they are just the examples that we used in Figure 1 in Introduction. For better comparison, we use the same scale for both cases.
In the top panel with observable savings, the agent's wages exhibit a quite sensitive response (a zig-zag pattern) to his performance: The wage goes up for any success, and drops given no success. In contrast, in the bottom panel with private savings, the response is muted: Wages are downward rigid, and pay raises are less frequent (only twice given four cash ows). Put differently, the agent's wage might go up or stay the same following successes, and he never gets pay cut after poor performance. The incentive is only re ected in the responsiveness of the agent's continuation payoff W , which corresponds to the value of his future pays or stock options in reality.
Finally, the wage policy also has noticeable impact on the termination policy. Given the long poor performance after t = 3:5 in Figure 4 , in the top panel with observable savings, the agent's continuation payoff falls at a lower rate than in the bottom panel; this is due to the downward wage adjustment along the path of poor performance. As a result, with observable savings (the top panel), the life span of the rm is longer (22:23) than that of the case with private savings (17:62). Besides, in contrast to zero severance pay when savings are observable, the agent in our model walks away with a positive severance pay.
The seemingly inef cient compensation patterns in the bottom panel, i.e., low compensation-performance sensitivities and generous severance payments even after poor performance, are usually viewed as symptoms of malfunctioned corporate governance (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2004) ). However, this paper shows that under realistic contracting friction assumptions, they are actually part of the optimal contract. By providing a concrete example, this paper raises a critique to the Bebchuk and Fried's logic ow from the observed "inef cient" forms of executive compensation to the failed corporate governance (for a similar point, see
Core, Guay, and Thomas (2004)).
Consumption contract vs. wage contract
It is worth emphasizing that we are only characterizing the optimal consumption contract, i.e., the optimal amount that the agent should consume given his performance history. This raises the question whether our optimal wage contract is unique, because the wage (compensation) contract is only an implementation of the desired consumption contract. A closely related question is, even though in the derived contract investors save for the agent, can the agent save for himself (hence truly private savings) while still achieving the desired consumption policy? Interestingly, since we rule out two-way transfers between investors and the agent (i.e., both wage c and severance pay F have to be nonnegative), the implementation is indeed unique before the region of M = L is reached. To see this, when M > L , along the equilibrium path it is always possible that the agent will be borrowing constrained (whenever M t < 0 so resetting a higher wage is possible). Therefore at these states, the agent, if given any positive private savings, will consume strictly more than the level stipulated by the optimal contract. . The solid line is for wage process, and the dotted line is for the agent's continuation payoff W . The history consists of 4 cash ows at t = 0:5, 1:0, 1:5, and 3:5; and no cash ow afterwards. Parameters are b = 0:5, Y = 20, r = 0:2, p = 0:5, = 5, and L = 1. Kocherlakota (2004) .
Comparison to
The main result in this paper is similar to Kocherlakota (2004) who studies a discrete-time model with single success. We use the techniques recently developed by Sannikov (2008) to analyze a continuous-time model with Poisson structure, and solves the general case with multiple successes. As emphasized in Remark 2, the main result of downward-rigidity is far from trivial in the setting of multiple successes. Moreover, we show that randomization is suboptimal, and verify the optimality of implementing working always (as opposed to implementing shirking or myopic actions sometimes); both steps are missing from Kocherlakota (2004) .
In this paper, we have endogenous terminations as a form of disciplinary mechanism, which is absent from Kocherlakota (2004) . As pointed out in Remark 1, the driving difference is that in Kocherlakota (2004)'s unemployment insurance setting, the agent's utility is independent of whether he is inside the unemployment insurance program or not. In contrast, in our rm-manager setting, it is natural to assume that the agent may enjoy some strictly positive perks-either pecuniary or nonpecuniary such as personal satisfaction-only during his tenure inside the rm. Moreover, the endogenous termination/ ring mechanism not only enriches our analysis, but also re ects plausible economics: In our model, when the agent is red, he loses future option value of being promoted-which captures certain aspects of top managers' career concerns.
Finally, a continuous-time framework employed here simpli es the analysis greatly. One important advantage is that we do not need to tackle the randomization issue around termination. 27 Speci cally, if the time is discrete, then in Figure 3 along the equilibrium path, W might drop below the termination line l(M ). As a result, a randomization scheme (potentially 2-dimensional!) is required before W hitting l(M )
to respect the agent's promise-keeping constraint.
6.1.4 Comparison to Harris and Holmstrom (1982) .
Besides the above discussion regarding the "inef ciency" of executive compensation, our model admits broader implications, and can be applied to any long-term labor compensation contracts where workers'
incentives are important. Harris and Holmstrom (1982) also derive downward-rigid wage contracts to be the optimal contract. In that model, learning about the agent's ability and the rm's one-sided commitment are the driving forces. In contrast, we obtain the same dynamic structure for the optimal contract under a framework with moral hazard only. In this regard, the theoretical predictions from our model is consistent with the empirical evidence mentioned in Harris and Holmstrom (1982) , i.e., the positive relationship between experience and earnings, and the positive skewness of earnings, etc.
Even though Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and this paper generate similar results, it is possible to separate these two theories empirically. Start with an agent who just receives a pay raise, and focus on how the ordering of his follow-up performance (i.e., whether successes comes before failures) affects his next pay raise. In typical learning models such as Harris and Holmstrom (1982) , the agent's performance is his underlying ability plus some i.i.d. noises, and the ordering of the agent's performance does not matter. It is because the simple average of these performance is the suf cient statistic in updating the agent's perceived ability, which determines the agent's pay raise if any. In contrast, in our model earlier successes lead to a higher continuation payoff W (due to the simple discounting effect r > 0; check (12)), and as a result the following pay raise should be greater. 28
Severance Package and Outside Option
The size of severance package depends on the agent's outside option once he leaves the rm. In the base model the agent has zero outside option; now suppose that he will receive a constant z in perpetuity after his layoff. 29 As the agent has an outside option u(z) r , the admissible continuation payoff W should be above this level. Geometrically, in the state space (W; M ) in Figure 3 , we need to impose an extra restriction that 
General Utility Functions
The adoption of CARA utility is only for exposition purposes. This section extends our analysis to a general utility function u ( ) that satis es the bounded-below marginal utility in condition (2). Similar to (16) is no longer a line as in the CARA case (see Figure 3 ). For the concavity of the value function J, we require that the domain f(W; M ) : W l (M )g to remain convex-in other words, l (M ) is a convex function. One can easily check that l (M ) is convex if and only if u 000 > (u 00 ) 2 u 0 , a property that is also satis ed by the class of power utility. The structure of resulting optimal contract remains unchanged: wages fcg are nondecreasing before M reaches its lower bound; the agent works for potential pay raises; and the agent's poor performance leads to dismissal, but he walks away with a severance payment c r . In Appendix A.10 interested readers can nd detailed constructions for the general utility case. 
Renegotiation-Proof Contract
In this model, because termination is ex-post inef cient, both parties tend to renegotiate whenever the original contract can be Pareto improved ex post. For the contract to be renegotiation proof, the value function J RP (W; M ) must have a non-increasing slope with respect to the agent's continuation payoff W ; otherwise, both party can be strictly better off by raising W . 30 For simplicity, we only consider a moderate impact of renegotiation by focusing on the case where the termination inef ciency is not excessive, i.e., a relatively high liquidation value L (see Appendix A.11 for details).
In Appendix A.11 we construct the value function J RP (W; M ) recursively. Analogous to the unidimensional result in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) r ) is strictly below the wage-setting curve W (M ); see the left panel in Figure 5 .
We have similar results for the renegotiation-proof optimal contract. However, when poor performance drives W down to W (M ), both parties run a lottery, whose outcome is independent of the cash ow occur- 30 The de nition of renegotiation-proofness here is the same as in DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) , which is equivalent to the contract being sequentially undominated (in terms of parties payoffs); see Hart and Tirole (1988) . In contrast, Hart and Moore (1998) 
The Complete Contract with Multi-Tasking: A Convergence Result
As argued before, we envision the myopic actions as the situation where once equipped with excessive incentives, the agent will be motivated to hurt the rm in certain ways that investors either cannot specify the damages in some veri able terms ex-ante, or are only able to discover future losses after the agent's tenure. By treating the myopic action loss as non-contractible, our contracting space is incomplete. How far is our optimal contract away from the optimal complete contract? To address this issue, we embed a multi-tasking problem (a la Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) ) into the main model. Assume that the rm's operation involves another business activity, which generates an instantaneous value increment as,
where fZ t g is a Brownian process independent of fN t g. Here dQ t , as the agent's second soft performance measure, is observable and contractible. We can also interpret dQ t as the (noisy) change of the rm's longrun value. To capture the "softness" of the dQ measure, in the following analysis we consider the case where is suf ciently large.
Neither shirking or working has any impact on the drift in dQ t . But once the agent takes the myopic action a = p, the drift becomes as the agent transfers his effort allocation from the soft performance dQ t to the hard performance dN t . Due to the risk-neutrality of investors, if the resulting complete contract chooses to ignore dQ t completely, then it is just the contract derived in Section 4.
When the loss is contractible through dQ t , investors can raise the incentive loading on dN t but still prevent the agent from taking myopic actions. The contract can specify an incentive scheme such as:
where the incentive loading
then the agent will be refrained from the myopic action: By taking a = p = p + , the agent gains k t from dN t , but this gain is offset by the loss x t from dQ t .
As discussed in Section 5.3.2, setting W t > b p , i.e., k t > 0, gives rise to a bene t in relaxing the nosavings constraint, as investors may specify dM D t > 0 (cut wages) on the path without success. However, setting k t > 0 and in turn x t = kt > 0 is costly. This is because by imposing positive loading x t > 0 on the agent's continuation payoff in (31), the noise in dQ t makes inef cient terminations more likely. In addition, it is also inef cient to expose the risk-averse agent to random noises. This trade-off leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 7 When ! 1 so that dQ t information becomes extremely "soft," the value from the optimal complete contract converges to the one from the incomplete contract derived in Section 4.
Intuitively, when the information precision of the soft performance goes to zero, the contract should simply ignore such extremely noisy signals, just as the incomplete contract does. This implies that, however small is the positive transaction cost in procuring the extremely "soft" information dQ, the "incomplete" contract derived in Section 4 can be optimal even in the paradigm of complete contracts.
In addition, in proving Proposition 7, we employ a new method in establishing the convergence result.
There, one can give some estimate for the potential gains from incorporating new contractible variables, without solving for the exact form of optimal complete contract. The convergence result then can be established by studying these estimates.
Conclusion
We study a dynamic agency problem where the agent can privately save. When ruling out private savings, previous studies (Rogerson (1985) , Sannikov (2008) , etc.) derive a front-loaded, performance-sensitive compensation ow in the optimal contract. In contrast, the optimal wage process in this paper becomes back-loaded, and relatively insensitive to performance.
Our optimal contract features a downward-rigid wage structure, and a seemingly "generous" severance pay even after the agent's poor performance. Both patterns, which are commonly observed in today's compensation packages, have received wide criticism due to their "suboptimality" in providing incentives ef ciently. Therefore, this paper delivers a general message that, under realistic contracting frictions-such as private savings and non-contractible myopic action studied in this paper-certain seemingly inef cient contracting features can indeed be optimal.
We solve the optimal contracting with private savings by utilizing the binding incentive-compatibility constraint in the presence of myopic actions, where the linearity of effort cost structure is important. However, in justifying the non-contractibility via information acquisition costs in Section 6.5, we employ a proof method which allows the agent's cost structure to be convex, and show the convergence result when the convexity diminishes. Therefore, our contracting result is generic in this regard.
We emphasize that the resulting contract form-especially the strict downward-rigid wage-is speci c to our particular setting. Take the base model, and suppose that the probability of success under shirking is strictly positive (say ") instead of 0. Then the necessary condition for the evolution of marginal utility is (1 "dt) M 0 t + "dtM 1 in general. However, the important lesson from our analysis is that, the downward speed depends on the off-equilibrium measure implied by shirking. As M 1 t > 0, the upward drift of M after failure is bounded by "M t dt, and downward drift of wage given failure vanishes as " goes to zero. Clearly, the choice of zero intensity of success under shirking in the paper helps us obtain the main theoretical result in its stark contrast to that of observable savings.
Therefore, a less responsive wage pattern and a positive severance pay, which are designed to reduce the agent's deviation values, should be robust when the agent can privately save. Of course, the exact degree of robustness needs future theoretical work to explore more general settings, which might give further guidelines in solving the optimal contracting problems with private savings. Spear, S., and S. Srivastava, 1987 combined with other action pro le a 0 to support a consumption pro le c 0 that achieve a strictly higher value for the agent. But then
with the action pro le a 0 can support c 0 under the original contract = ffcg ; F ; g, contradiction to the optimality of fb c t 6 = c t ; S t 0g under the original contract .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Take the zero saving policy as given. Under the preassumption that a t = p for all t, the agent's value process then differentiate both sides we obtain the expression in (7). Now consider any feasible effort process a = fa t 2 f0; p; pg : t 2 [0; )g. The agent's associated value process V t (a) could be written as Therefore, to implement working it must be the case that (a t p) W s b p 0 for both a t = 0 and a t = p. This implies that W s = b p , a binding incentive-compatibility constraint. It directly follows that the agent obtains the same value by taking any action process fag s.t. a t = 0 or p. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3
Clearly ring the agent delivers the continuation payoff of W = U (M ) r . Now we show that there are no other ways to deliver W = U (M ) r . We have two steps to go, and in the following argument t can be understood as t as the information at (t dt; t] is irrelevant. 1) Note that to respect condition (9), given a marginal utility M , any continuation payoff W < U (M ) r is infeasible. The argument is as follows. In light of Proposition 2, for any equilibrium effort policy a, no savings implies that M t E a t (Ms) for s > t (s could be larger than , in which case the agent is red and the distribution is degenerate). According to the de nition of W t which is the agent's optimal value, we have
where the rst " " is due to the possibility of Ms = L , the second " " is due to the convexity of U ( ) (in the CARA case it is a linear function; see related discussions in Section 6.3); and the third " " is because U ( ) is decreasing.
2) The necessary condition (12) implies that at the point W = U (M ) r , W is a martingale. Since W cannot fall, it has to be remain constant U (M ) r from then on. Because the agent obtains the same payoff by shirking and working, this implies zero potential shirking bene t. Therefore in this case the agent is red.
A.6 Appendix for Section 4
Given K which is total number of potential cash ows, we use i K to indicate the number of cash ows remaining, and we are solving for J i;K . But in our setting, since only the number of cash ows remaining matters, J i;K is independent of K. Therefore we omit K in the following analysis.
A.6.1 Production Stage
When i = 0, there is no future cash ows, and the rm is obsolete. Based on the de nition of J L (W ) in (18), we have Lemma 4 For the wage-setting stage value function j i 1 , we have the following properties: We carry out our analysis based on the following linear transformation, where the domain is a rectangle. Let e j i (w; m) = e
The second inequality follows from the following fact: note that J L U (m)
Shortly we will need a stronger estimate for the global concavity of e j. According to (23) Now we show that e j i , in fact, is globally concave, which requires that e j i ww e j i mm > e j i wm 2 . To show this, we invoke the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Observe that the terms other than the integral in e j i ww , e j i mm , and e j i wm are p 2 where the third inequality uses the fact that O 1 (g) is concave, M f < M < M g , and M g attains the maximum. The second discounting condition is straightforward. Note that we have focused on the case M > L ; however, the previous construction also applies to the line with M = L and W < which is the rst-best result when K, the maximum number of cash ows generated by the agent, is 1. When K is nite, we can just replace pY r with pY r 1 p r+p K in the above equation.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
The existence of J (W; M ) is established in Section A.6.3. To maximize E t e rt dG t , we need to maximize pJ W + b p ; M + M The FOC of c M (recall the de nition of U ( ) in Eq. (16) and c ( ) in Eq. (17)) yields that (we can also easily check that FOC is suf cient because RHS is concave in c M ) c M = M e rS :
Plugging in, we have E t h e rt dG A t i =dt 0: Because the inequality could hold in equality when the optimal policy is used, standard veri cation argument similar to the proof of Proposition 5 shows our claim.
Given this lemma, the agent's value without saving S 0 = 0 is just W , which is achieved by working and no saving. This shows our claim. We take to be arbitrarily small. Because J W M < 0, when M is xed, J M attains the maximum when W = U (M ) r . Therefore a suf cient condition, which can be veri ed easily ex-post, is is zero at w i (m). Therefore we de ne
We assume that w i (m) de ned in (45) . We have the following lemma for e j RP;i .
Lemma 10 For the production-stage value function e j RP;i (w; m), we have 2. e j RP;i ww < 0, e j RP;i mm < 0, e j RP;i wm > 0, and e j RP;i ww e j RP;i mm e j RP;i wm 2 > 0. Therefore e j RP;i (w; m) is concave. For detailed proofs, see He (2007) . When L is small (for instance, L = 0), w (m) and W RP; (m) U (m) r both bind at b r . At this point, without success the agent stays at that point, and after a jump the agent is promoted to another point with a lower m (higher wages). Because the termination is extremely inef cient (pY > b L so keeping the project alive is better off always), termination will be off-equilibrium.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 7
Since dQ information does not add value in implementing a = 0 or a = p, both actions are suboptimal. In implementing a = p, recall that dW t = (rW t U (M t )) dt + W t (dN t pdt) + x t (dQ t dt) ;
where W t = b p +k t > b p , and x t kt . Note that k t 0; otherwise the agent shirks (without affecting the dQ t performance).
Suppose that the evolution of M can be written as,
Now for investors, the value still can be written as J Y Q = E [G ] with G de ned in (27), under some optimal contract that incorporates both the Y and Q information. As G 0 = J, J Y Q J = E [G G 0 ], the net gain by incorporating Q performance is
